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Animal Farmi Jurisprudence:2 Hiding
Personal Predilections Behind the "Plain
Language" of the Takings Clause
STEPHEN M. DURDEN*
INTRODUCTION
For a decade, the author has stood in front of law students
asking questions about constitutional law and occasionally an-
swering them, more often responding to questions with questions.
For that same amount of time, students have requested and de-
manded and begged for simple answers. They want, for example, a
note card version of the Political Question Doctrine. The author
has, perhaps unnecessarily, chafed at such requests, commenting,
"Constitutional analysis is not simplistic." 3 Notwithstanding this
effort at proclaiming the difficulty of constitutional analysis to the
students, an elusive animal regularly appeared in Supreme Court
decisions, an animal known as plain language (plain meaning)
textualism. This animal proclaimed, to all who would open their
literal and figurative eyes, the "plain" meaning of this or that con-
stitutional provision. This sporadic, yet persistent, appearance of
the "plain language" animal has created doubts in the mind of the
author, forcing the author to consider the possibility that the Con-
stitution is indeed "plain." What follows is the journey of the au-
thor to understand this animal or at least some aspect of it.
The paper first defines plain language textualism and demon-
strates that the Supreme Court and its individual justices as well
as many commentators regularly call upon plain language textu-
* Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. Thank you to my family and
Masahiro Takeda my research assistant.
1. George Orwell, Animal Farm (Penguin Group 1996) (1946).
2. Stephen M. Durden, Plain Language Textualism: Ensconcing Personal
Predilections into the Constitution, 26 QUINNIPlAc L. REV. 337 (2008).
3. Besides, if constitutional analysis was simplistic, constitutional law profes-
sors would be out of business except to read the simplistic black letter law to the
students. And while students might be spellbound to hear a professor read a Harry
Potter book, e.g., J.K. RoWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (1998),
those students are not likely to be spellbound when the same professor reads "Black
Letter Constitutional Law."
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alism. Next, the paper seeks to determine why these people seek
plain language textualism as a constitutional interpretive meth-
odology, attempting to explain what others see as the benefit of
that methodology. In other words, the paper presumes that those
who use plain language textualism believe that such a method is a
better method of interpretation. The paper next reviews the justi-
fication for using plain language textualism. The final question
concerns how a person "plainly" interprets the Constitution and
whether the application of plain language textualism furthers the
justification for using that interpretive methodology.
More specifically, this article seeks to demonstrate that plain
language textualism, an interpretive method that purports to
eliminate the personal predilections of individual justices when
interpreting the Constitution, instead ensconces personal predi-
lections 4 and requires inconsistent interpretive methodologies. In
order to do so, this paper will review the use of plain meaning or
plain language textualism as applied to the Takings Clause. After
showing that commentators have asserted at least two very differ-
ent and inconsistent textualist meanings to the Takings Clause,
the paper will demonstrate that even accepting a single meaning
of the Takings Clause requires a number of separate non-textual
conclusions as to the assumptions to be made as to the application
of textualism. On the surface, this paper seeks to demonstrate
that plain meaning textualism incorporates the personal predilec-
tions of the interpreter.
In the end, this paper seeks to be a voice of reason. By demon-
strating the inconsistencies in the use of plain meaning textual-
ism, this paper seeks to eliminate interpretive stridency and
superiority. This paper seeks to show that even plain meaning
textualism, perhaps the simplest (and most simplistic) interpre-
tive methodology, requires non-textual, individual choices by jus-
tices. If all justices must resort to individual choices, then such
individual choices (often labeled as "personal predilections") can-
not, or at least should not, be labeled as inappropriate (or worse)
simply or merely because they are individual choices. The ques-
tion should be whether the choices that are made make sense, and
whether they resonate within the society known as the Supreme
Court, the society of the rest of the bench, the bar, and society as a
whole.
4. Durden, supra note 2.
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PLAIN LANGUAGE TEXTUALISM DEFINED OR
DESCRIBED
The Constitution does not define "textualism" or "plain lan-
guage textualism." Indeed, the Constitution does not mention tex-
tualism or plain language. While many have described
"textualism," 5 perhaps, none have actually defined or attempted
to define "plain language textualism."6 Consequently, this paper
must, in some sense, define the term. In many ways this task is
equivalent to defining a more concrete noun, such as a tree. The
definition of the tree, outside of a biological science context, is, of
necessity, a matter of describing what is seen or perceived by
other senses. Because plain language textualism is no more self-
defining than a tree, this paper describes what appear to be the
observable characteristics of plain language textualism, based on
observations of its use in various writings. The paper, to aid in
understanding plain language textualism, will also distinguish a
few other versions of textualism.
Textualism comes in many flavors, 7 including, inter alia,
plain meaning or plain language textualism. Arguably, each ver-
sion of textualism claims "fidelity to the text."" Various forms of
contextual textualism include: (1) "legislative contextualism,"9 (2)
"semantic contextualism,"10 or (3) "linguistic context [ualism]. " 1'
Contextual textualists seek the true meaning of words and
phrases by using various contexts. Others, such as Justices Scalia
5. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 749, 750 (1995) ("Textualism refers to ... deriv[ing] the putatively objective
meaning of [a] word or phrase."); Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener's Errors,
and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 30 (2006). On the other hand,
"Black's Law Dictionary does not contain a definition for 'textualism."' Tom Levinson,
Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The "Fundamentalist" Judicial Persona of
Justice Antonin Scalia, 26 PACE L. REV. 445, 445 n.3 (2006).
6. This author has made the effort in another article.
7. The author goes into greater detail as to the versions of textualism in another
article. Durden, supra note 2.
8. G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV.
1089, 1163 (2005).
9. Gregory E. Maggs, Estoppel and Textualism, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 167 (2006)
("judges are to determine the objective meaning of an enactment from its text and
legislative context").
10. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006); Joel Schellhammer, Defining the Court's Role As Faithful
Agent in Statutory Interpretation: Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Serv, Inc., 125 S.
Ct. 2611 (2005), 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1119, 1128 (2006).
11. E.g., Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50
VILL. L. REV. 25, 27 (2005).
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and Thomas, assert textual fidelity while relying on "original
meaning" of the Constitution, 12 "original intent,"13 and "intent of
the Founders." 14 An interesting example of textualism belongs to
commentator Kelly Hollowell who asserts that the existence of a
plain textual meaning is based on first determining the interests
"within the scope of particular constitutional provisions"15 and
then declaring the meaning plain in light of the interests found.
The textualism reviewed in this paper does not rely on "con-
texts" or "interests" or even history. This paper refers to textual-
ism which purports to interpret the words of the Constitution
without outside assistance. Some authors refer to this interpretive
model as "plain language textualism," 16 while others refer to it as
"plain meaning textualis [m]."17 Rather than refer to the methodol-
ogy by name, many, perhaps most, simply just use it. For example,
many suggest that the Constitution, or at least a particular
phrase or word has a plain meaning,' 8 or instead, they refer to the
12. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 523 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1187 n.10 (2003).
13. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 323 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridgements" of Scien-
tific Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review under the First Amendment, 54
EMORY L.J. 979, 1001 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Richard A. Champagne, Jr., The Problem of Integrity, Tradition, and
Text in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 78, 80, 88 (1993).
15. Kelly J. Hollowell, Defining a Person under the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Constitutionally and Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67, 82
(2002). According to Hallowell's "plain meaning," a fetus is a person within the words
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Interestingly, this still would not support her view
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects fetuses because the amendment protects
"persons born." A fetus, by (scientific) definition is not born. Alternatively, according
to her version of "plain meaning," the words "person born" refer to what is by any
other definition the "unborn." To rephrase, under this "plain meaning," "born" and
"unborn" have the same meaning. While perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment should
be interpreted to protect the "unborn," that conclusion should be based on something
other than a claimed reliance on the "plain meaning" of the text.
16. Very few articles use the term "plain language textualism." See, e.g., Durden,
supra note 2; Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs no Penalty: Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc. and Discriminatory Boundaries in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 18 LAW & INEQ. 131, 180 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 34 (2006).
18. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global
Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 473 n.45 (2007). Interestingly, the author, J. Andrew
Kent, first refers to "plain meaning" and then proceeds to state that in order to inter-
pret the Constitution he will make inferences from the Constitution. He also confesses
to his very personal approach to plain meaning textualism as he describes the inter-
pretation of the Constitution as based on his "reading of text and structure" while
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/3
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"plain language" of a particular word or phrase. 19 Rarely do those
who use plain language textualism define or explain their inter-
pretive model.20 One can fairly gather that plain language textu-
alists do not give an explanation because the plain language
textualist views the method as obvious. This paper supplies a brief
explanation, if not exactly a definition, of "plain language
textualism."
A plain language interpretation begins by identifying a par-
ticular set of words in the Constitution and then stating that the
language is "plain" or that the meaning is "plain." The plain lan-
guage textualist does not, however, define the term, "plain." Plain
could mean "obvious"21 or "simple"22 or both. Whichever "plain"
approach the plain language textualist uses, the textualist clearly
demands a catholic and non-debatable meaning to the constitu-
tional term. Plain language textualism admits of only one inter-
pretation, the interpretation stated (or demanded) by the plain
language textualist. 23 Plain language textualism leaves no room
for debate as to meaning or questioning of the authority of the
person who uses plain language textualism. Because the plain
language textualist demands that only one possible meaning ex-
ists, then implicitly, the definition is also eternal. Where only one
possible meaning exists on the face of the Constitution, the plain
language textualist cannot look to historical meanings. Plain lan-
"attempt[ing] to take into account the purposes animating the constitutional provi-
sions." It is difficult to see what is plain about language if it is conjoined with a per-
sonal reading, as well as completely extra-textual purposes, and reader-drawn
inferences (as opposed to what might be asserted to be objective implications of the
words). In a sense, Mr. Kent makes the point of the article: that there is no plain
language textualism without relying on personal predilections.
19. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemp-
tion? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 59 (1996).
20. One commentator suggests that the plain meaning "is the only meaning that
fits the relevant interpretive evidence." Richard M. Cooper, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 6
(2003) (footnote omitted).
21. See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115
YALE L.J. 922, 947 (2006). The Supreme Court has used the phrase "plain and obvi-
ous" perhaps indicating a redundancy or at least an overlap in meaning. See, e.g.,
International Harvester Cr. Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 545 n.ll (1956). But see,
e.g., Cooper, supra note 20, at 6 (2003) (footnote omitted) ("Plain meaning is not the
same as obvious or obviously correct meaning; often, it takes hard work to show that a
particular meaning is the plain meaning of a statute") (i.e., that it is the only meaning
that fits the relevant interpretive evidence).
22. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 335 (1958)
("This statute is written in simple words of plain meaning .... ").
23. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where the
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation
does not arise.").
20081 359
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guage textualism does not provide reasoning or rational as to de-
termining the meaning of the word. Indeed, rationalization would
be irrational or at least superfluous if the phrase has an obvious,
simple, timeless and catholic meaning.24 Finally, the plain lan-
guage textualist does not rely on or refer to dictionaries or other
sources.25 Again, relying on dictionaries would be an admission
that the words are not so plain after all and may subject the inter-
pretation to a separate debate as to whether an old or new diction-
ary is appropriate as reference. 26 In the end, this paper defines
plain language textualism as an interpretative method whereby
the interpreter states the meaning of a word or phrase without
any explanation other than to say that the meaning or language is
"plain."
PLAIN LANGUAGE TEXTUALISM: A COMMON
INTERPRETIVE METHOD
The Supreme Court has applied, or purported to apply, plain
language textualism to a variety of provisions of the Constitu-
tion. 27 Indeed, justices of the Court have relied on "plain" meaning
in cases from 179828 to 2003.29 Among the various provisions de-
clared to have a plain meaning are (1) the Commerce Clause;30 (2)
24. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 771 (1991) (footnote omitted)
("Scalia and like-minded textualists argue that where the import of the language is
clear on its face, the courts should end their analysis without considering extrinsic
explanations of meaning.").
25. See, e.g., Steven J. Johansen, What does Ambiguous Mean? Making Sense of
Statutory Analysis in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 219, 229-30 (1998); Eileen A.
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of the Evidence, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1771 (1995). Of course, many textualists consult dictionaries. What
this article describes and defines is the form of textualism where the textualist pro-
claims the meaning of the word or phrase, proclaims that the meaning or language is
"plain" and offers no explanation and no reference, to a dictionary or otherwise. See
also Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical
Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 861 (2006); Rickie Sonpal,
Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2193 (2003).
26. See Rickie Sonpal's outstanding review of the use of dictionaries and the vari-
ous choices that can and must be made in choosing a dictionary definition. Sonpal,
supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1990). See also U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (Chase, J.)
29. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
30. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States 175 U.S. 211, 234-35 (1899). For a
completely different "plain" meaning see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589
(1995) (Thomas, J. concurring).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/3
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Article I, Section 9, Clause 4;31 (3) Article I, Section 7.32 Dissent-
ing and concurring justices also often rely on plain language tex-
tualism. Some of the constitutional provisions asserted to be plain
include (1) the First Amendment; 33 (2) the Sixth Amendment; 34
(4) the Fifth Amendment; (5) the Eighth Amendment;35 (6) the
Tenth Amendments; 36 (7) the Eleventh Amendment;37 (8) the
Fourth Amendment;38 and (9) Article III. 39 Virtually every justice
since 1970 has relied upon or purported to rely upon "plain" lan-
guage either via his or her own opinion or through joining an opin-
ion rely upon "plain" language. These justices include Chief
Justices Burger 40 and Rehnquist, 41 as well as Associate Justices
Souter, 42 Kennedy, 43 Powell, 44 Brennan, 45 Scalia, 46 O'Connor,47
Ginsburg, 48 Breyer, 49 Marshall, 50 and Blackmun.5' Commenta-
tors also routinely assert that constitutional provisions have a
plainly observable and stated meaning. Some of those purportedly
plain provisions include (1) the First Amendment; 52 (2) the Second
31. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 622 (1895).
32. Okanogan v. United States (The Pocket Veto Case), 279 U.S. 655, 686 n.l
(1929).
33. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
34. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
35. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 39 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 855-56 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
37. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
38. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 519 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
41. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 855 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
42. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 114 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
43. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
592-93 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
44. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 519 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
45. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 866-68 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
46. Id. See also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 39 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); Terry, 494 U.S. at 592-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
47. Terry, 494 U.S. at 592-93(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 114 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37
ARiz. ST. L.J. 999, 1030 (2005). Cf H. Franklin Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, The
Law of Obscenity-or Absurdity?, 15 ST. THoMAs L. REV. 517, 541 (2003).
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Amendment; 53 (3) the Fourth Amendment; 54 (4) the Fifth Amend-
ment;5 5 (5) the Sixth Amendment;56 (6) the Seventh Amend-
ment;57 (7) the Eighth Amendment;58 (8) the Ninth Amendment;5 9
(9) the Tenth Amendment;60 (10) the Eleventh Amendment;61 and
53. See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original
Intent and Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 130
(2003); Roy Lucas, From Patsone & Miller to Silveira v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear
Arms, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 257, 301 (2004); Matthew S. Nosanchuk, The Embar-
rassing Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 29 N. Ky. L. REV. 705, 793 (2002);
Ronald S. Resnick, Private Arms as the Palladium of Liberty: The Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 2, 10 (1999).
54. See, e.g., Jose Felipe Anderson, Accountability Solutions in the Consent Search
and Seizure Wasteland, 79 NEB. L. REV. 711, 724 (2000); Bill 0. Heder, The Develop-
ment of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 71, 78
(1999).
55. See, e.g., Heather G. Wight-Axling, Will the Durational Element Endure? Only
Time Will Tell: Temporary Regulatory Takings in the Court of Federal Claims and
Federal Circuit after Tahoe-Sierra, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 205 (2005); Michael
Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting the Privilege Against
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEo. L.J. 2445, 2448, 2450 (2002); Mark Tunick,
Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings Clause and
Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 886 (2001); J. H. Reichman, Computer
Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for
Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 647, 658 n.58 (1989);
Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determin-
ing Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 938 n.183 (1980).
56. See, e.g., Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Craw-
ford World, 71 Mo. L. REV. 285, 310 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Suha A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur
Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 753 (2003).
58. See, e.g., Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous
Excess Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After
United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 513 (2000); Joseph L. Lester,
Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment's Right to Bail, 32 N.
KY. L. REV. 1, 2, 22 (2005).
59. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 242 (2004).
60. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "A Formstone of Our Federalism:" The Erie!
Hanna Doctrine and Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 511 (2005);
Lang Jin, Printz v. Unites States: The Revival of Constitutional Federalism, 26 PEPP.
L. REV. 631, 634 (1999); Nancie G. Marzulla, Clarence Thomas and the Fifth Amend-
ment: His Philosophy and Adherence to Protecting Property Rights, 12 REGENT U. L.
REV. 549, 554 (1999); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs
and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1600 n.26 (2005);
Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 379, 380 (2000); Carol Tebben, Native Americans and the Constitution:
An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 330 (2003).
61. See, e.g., Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 521 (2006).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/3
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(11) the Twelfth Amendment. 62 These justices, commentators and
the Supreme Court regularly refer to some form or other of "plain"
meaning/language. However, they may or may not be suggesting
that all the parts of the particular amendment or provision's area
is "plain." As for this paper, the task of taking on the validity vel
non of every assertion of "plain meaning" would be akin to count-
ing grains of sand on the beach. Instead, this paper will focus on
one provision of the Constitution, the Takings Clause. 63 This arti-
cle does not propose to demonstrate that one or more plain lan-
guage interpretations is more or less plain or valid than another.
Instead, this article seeks to demonstrate that plain language tex-
tualism is merely another form of constitutional interpretation
wherein the interpreter makes, perhaps countless, personal
choices in creating an interpretation of the Constitution with
which the interpreter hopes others will agree.
USING "PLAIN LANGUAGE" TO INTERPRET THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Supreme Court commonly refers to the "plain" language
or meaning of the Takings Clause.64 The Court has noted, "As its
text makes plain, the Takings Clause 'does not prohibit the taking
of property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power.' 65 According to the Court, the Takings Clause "plainly"
permits the government to "take" property66 so long as it compen-
sates the former owner.67 In this case, the Court refers to "ac-
quir[ing]" property via "condemnation" or "physical
appropriation." 68
This interpretation has created, in and of itself, little debate.
Takings Clause debate often revolves around "Regulatory Tak-
62. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz and & Benjamin Wittes, The Lawfulness of the Elec-
tion Decision: A Reply to Professor Tribe, 49 VILL. L. REV. 429, 437 (2004).
63. Occasionally, the Supreme Court and commentators will also refer to the Just
Compensation Clause. For ease of discussion, this paper for the most part refers to
the Takings Clause.
64. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005); John D.
Echeverria, From a "Darkling Plain" to What?: The Regulatory Takings Issue in U.S.
Law and Policy, 30 VT. L. REV. 969, 975 (2006).
65. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 at 536 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)).
66. What is "property" is not so plain.
67. See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321-22 (2002).
68. Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003).
20081 363
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ings."69 Oversimplified, a regulatory taking occurs when a regula-
tion goes "too far."70 The Court has recently divided claims in this
area into three71 or four 72 categories of regulatory takings.73 For
the moment, the exact boundaries (if any) for regulatory takings is
not significant. What matters here is that the Court asserts that
these types of takings can be (perhaps should be) distinguished
from "Plain Language Takings," i.e., takings claims permitted/cre-
ated under the "plain language" of the Constitution. For example,
the Court has stated, "[t]he Constitution contains no comparable
reference [i.e., no plain language reference] to regulations that
prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private
property."74 Consequently, "[tihe text of the Fifth Amendment it-
self provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical
takings and regulatory takings. '75 In this case, the Court has re-
lied on plain language textualism in order to support both its opin-
ion as to what the language plainly incorporates and what it
plainly leaves out. However, the Court has not used plain lan-
guage textualism as the definitive boundary when interpreting
the Takings Clause.
As noted, the Court has not limited takings claims to those
claims that fall squarely within its view of the plain language of
the Takings Clause, regularly permitting claims to be brought
under the Takings Clause even when government makes no at-
tempt to acquire or appropriate property. In order to maintain
what the Court perceives as necessary control over regulatory tak-
69. See also Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (discussing three standards of regulatory tak-
ings); Regulatory Takings-"Substantially Advances" Test, 119 H~av. L. REV. 297
(2005) (reviewing the "substantially advances" test of regulatory takings); Jonathan
Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
130, 143 n.46 (2005).
70. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
71. Hannah Jacobs, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings
Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1535-36 (2007); Robert S. Mangiaratti, Regulatory
Takings Claims in Massachusetts Following the Lingle and Gove Decisions, 90 MAss.
L. REV. 54 (2006).
72. John C. Keene, When does a Regulation "Go Too Far?"-The Supreme Court's
Analytical Framework for Drawing the Line between and Exercise of the Police Power
and an Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 397,
419-20 (2006); Jennie C. Nolon, Comment, Kelo's Wake: In Search of a Proportional
Benefit, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 274-77 (2007).
73. Perhaps it is three. Perhaps it is four. One commentator says "four tests ...
three distinct types of takings." See Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as
Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. RES. & ENvTL. L. 1, 3 (2005-2006).
74. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321
(2002).
75. Id. at 321-22.
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ings claims, the Court has attempted to keep all Takings Claims
at least "tethered ... to the text of the Takings Clause [or] to the
basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged
under the Clause."76 In sum, as to the Takings Clause, while the
Supreme Court's decisions indicate that the clause has "plain" lan-
guage, and while these decisions attempt to maintain a tie to that
"plain" language, the Court certainly does not employ plain lan-
guage textualism as its sole interpretive methodology as to the
meaning of that clause. Essentially, the Court indicates that the
Takings Clause has plain meaning, plus what the Court adds to it.
Oversimplified, commentators often agree with the Court's
version of the plain meaning of the Takings Clause. 77 They also
tend to agree that regulatory takings are not within the plain lan-
guage of the Constitution. 78 These commentators part ways with
the Court as to the validity of recognizing regulatory takings as
legitimate constitutional claims. Many commentators agree that
the Takings Clause has a plain meaning.79 Some commentators
note, almost in passing, the "plainness" of the meaning of the Tak-
ings Clause.80 These authors merely note the "plainness" and
move on.8' Other commentators state the "plainness" of the clause
76. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
77. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original
Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1148 (2000).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Mark A. Bross, The Impact of Ornelas v. United States on the Appel-
late Standard of Review for Seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 871, 886 (2007); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1564, 1665 (2003); Hart, supra note 77, at 1134-35; Daniel
A. Jacobs, Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451, 458 (2006); Douglas
T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars are Un-
dermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public's Trust, 25 HRv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 453 (2001); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent:
Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause,
80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 732 (2002); Kenneth Salzberg,"Takings" as Due Process, or Due
Process as "Takings?", 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 420 n.42 (2002); Andrew W. Schwartz,
Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory
Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (2004); Joseph William Singer, After the
Flood: Equality and Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 Loy. L. REV. 243, 286 (2006);
David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces of the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 541 (2004); Jonathan Zasloff, Left and
Right in the Middle East: Notes on the Social Construction of Race, 47 VA. J. INT'L. L.
201, 227 (2006).
80. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 77, at 1148; Kendall & Sorkin, supra note 79, at
453; Zasloff, supra note 79, at 227.
81. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 77, at 1148; Kendall & Sorkin, supra note 79, at
453; Zasloff, supra note 80, at 227.
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and assert that the Court should limit takings claims to that sin-
gular meaning.8 2 In doing so, they often argue what the "plain"
meaning does not incorporate.83
Essentially, the debate concerns whether the Court's inter-
pretation of the Takings Clause, i.e., its failure to rely solely on
the asserted plain language of the clause, can be justified. The
anti-regulatory takings commentators urge that the Takings
Clause contains plain language and the Court should be limited to
that plain language. This article does not seek to prove or disprove
any particular plain meaning. Instead, this article reviews how
plain language textualism works by reviewing its application to
the Takings Clause. This process of applying plain language tex-
tualism will shed light on the value of plain language textualism
as a method of constitutional interpretation.
JUSTIFYING PLAIN LANGUAGE TEXTUALISM AS A
METHOD OF ELIMINATING PERSONAL
PREDILECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
As noted, this article seeks to judge the value, perhaps valid-
ity, of plain language textualism based on one of the justifications
for using that interpretive model. In order to achieve that goal this
paper will look for the justifications for using plain language tex-
tualism. Forms of this question might be: (1) what interpreta-
tional benefit does plain language textualism purport to achieve;
(2) what interpretational problem does plain language textualism
seek to elimintate; or (3) in what way is plain language textualism
a better (more valid) interpretive method? For ease of understand-
ing, the answers to these questions will be referred to as justifica-
tions for plain language textualism. Rather than attempt to
identify and then discuss each possible or asserted or alleged justi-
fication, this paper will focus only on one.
82. See, e.g., Tunick, supra note 55, at 886.
83. Id.
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Supreme Court justices8 4 and commentators85 often decry the
use of personal predilections in constitutional interpretation.8 6
Justices assert their duty to avoid personalizing their interpreta-
tion. During their confirmation hearings, the two people most re-
cently elevated to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, who may or may not be textualists, agreed that Su-
preme Court justices should not permit personal beliefs to affect
or interfere with constitutional interpretation. As stated by Chief
Justice Roberts:
[Tihe ideal in the American justice system is epitomized by the
fact that judges, justices do wear the black robes, and that is
meant to symbolize the fact that they're not individuals promot-
ing their own particular views, but they are supposed to be do-
ing their best to interpret the law, to interpret the Constitution
according to the rule of law, not their own preferences, not their
own personal beliefs. That's the ideal.8 7
Justice Alito echoed these sentiments stating: "[M~y obliga-
tion as a judge is to interpret and apply the Constitution and the
laws of the United States and not my personal religious beliefs or
any special moral beliefs that I have.... I have a particular role to
play as a judge."88 While these comments may not be directly tied
to textualism, other justices have relied on the elimination of per-
sonal predilections when justifying the use of plain language or
84. Justice Scalia often attacks jurisprudence based on what he terms "personal
predilections." See, e.g., John L. Horan, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479, 494-95 (1993). Interestingly, Justice
Scalia himself is not immune to claims that his jurisprudence is based on personal
predilections. Susan M. Raeker-Jordan, Parsing Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look
at the Supreme Court's Cruel and Unusual Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 58 ME. L.
REV. 99, 102 (2006). See also Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by
Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648 (1987).
85. John F. Basiak, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due
Process: The Demise of "Split-The-Difference" Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV.
861 (2007).
86. See, e.g., id. at 892; Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When
Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 160 (2007).
87. Rebekah L. Osborn, Beliefs on the Bench: Recusal for Religious Reasons and
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 895, 899, n.31 (2006)
(quoting U.S. S. Judiciary Comm. Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of John Rob-
erts to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Judge
John Roberts).
88. Osborn, supra note 87, at 896 n.8 (quoting S. Judiciary Comm. Holds a Hear-
ing on Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito).
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some other form of textualism. For example, "the Great Chief Jus-
tice,"8 9 John Marshall, wrote:
Where [the Constitution's] terms are plain, I should ... deem it
judicial sacrilege to put my hands on any of its provisions, and
arrange or construe them according to any fancied use, object,
purpose, or motive, which by an ingenious train of reasoning, I
might bring my mind to believe was the reason for its adoption
by the sovereign power, from whose hands it comes to me as the
rule and guide to my faith my reason, and judicial oath.90
While the Chief Justice does not use the terms "plain lan-
guage textualism" or "personal predilections," those terms cer-
tainly are consistent with his discussion.
Justices Black91 and the second Justice Harlan92 concurred in
Chief Justice Marshall's view that "plain language" must super-
sede the "personal predilections" of justices. Justice Scalia93 and
the second Justice White have also expressed concern with creat-
ing a constitution based on the predilections of individual jus-
tices.94 The overriding implication appears to be that "plain
language textualism" is justified by the desire to eliminate from
constitutional interpretation the personal views of the individual
justices. Often the assertion of plain language relates to asserting
89. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (Wilson Carey McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 1996). See also Jack
N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061,
1062 (2007) (referring to Chief Justice John Marshall as "the Great Chief Justice").
90. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 41 (1831). An irony lost on the Chief
Justice, his justification for using plain language required both a metaphor ("hand")
and a reference to "sovereign power," a term nowhere in the Constitution. He added,
"I will not take away from the words of this book of prophecy." Id. Perhaps another
irony, that books of prophecy are notoriously arcane and oblique, perhaps the antithe-
sis of plain.
91. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 13 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) ("I still pre-
fer to trust the liberty of the citizen to the plain language of the Constitution rather
than to the sense of fairness of particular judges.").
92. Id. at 23-24 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("By in-
venting its own verbal formula the prevailing opinion simply seeks to reshape the
Constitution in accordance with predilections of what is deemed desirable. Constitu-
tional interpretation is not an easy matter, but we should be especially cautious about
substituting our own notions for those of the Framers.").
93. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989).
94. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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that an interpretation conflicts with plain language. 95 Justice
Black wrote that he "prefer[red] to trust the liberty of the citizen
to the plain language of the Constitution rather than to the sense
of fairness of particular judges."96 Commentators have noted that
other justices of the Court have expressed similar views, i.e., that
justices should not let personal predilections or beliefs control
their interpretation of the Constitution. 97 Linda Greenhouse notes
that Justice Blackmun "engaged in a career-long struggle to rec-
oncile his personal opposition to the death penalty with his view
that judicial duty required him to refrain from interpreting the
Constitution to conform to his personal beliefs." 98
Commentators often parrot the idea that personal predilec-
tions should not be part of constitutional interpretation99 and that
using plain language textualism (or at least textualism in general)
eliminates or attempts to eliminate those personal predilec-
tions.100 One commentator notes that, "[c]hief among the virtues
of textualism is that it removes the individual judge from in-
venting, instead of interpreting, the law."'10 1 "Of course, accusa-
tions that justices have allowed their personal predilections to
drive their interpretations of constitutional text are common. '10 2
According to Barry Friedman, many in the South condemned the
justices of the Court, because in its Brown v. Board of Education
95. E.g., Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 593
(1990) (Kennedy, J. dissenting); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 525
(1982) (Powell, J. dissenting).
96. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 13 (Black, J., concurring). See also Uphaus v. Wyman,
364 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholar-
ship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 532 (2002).
98. Linda Greenhouse, Marvin Anderson Lecture: Harry Blackmun, Independence
and Path Dependence, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1236 (2005).
99. See, e.g., Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Law: Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 540 (1986);
Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1986);
Kevin McNamee, Comment, Do as I Say and Not as I Do: Dickerson, Constitutional
Common Law and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1300
(2001); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's
Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 824 (1997); Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of"Relig-
ion" in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181, 210 n.163 (2002).
100. See, e.g., Darlene Addie Kennedy, Eschewing the Superlegislative Prerogative:
Tax Opinions of Justice Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 571, 582
(1999-2000). But see Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper
Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 497 (1983).
101. Levinson, supra note 5, at 471.
102. Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CoNN. L. REV. 389,
472 n.468 (2004).
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decision, 10 3 the Court "substiut[ed] naked power for established
law" and "impos[ed]" "personal predilections." 1 0 4 Put in a more af-
firmative tone, the "judiciary [should] serve as a disinterested
guardian of the people in interpreting the Constitution. "10 5 As put
by one commentator:
If members of the Court were not capable of interpreting the law
in some more or less objective manner, then judicial review
would be indefensible-or, at least, not defensible under the
logic of Marbury [v. Madison. 10 6] As Professor Frickey observed,
'judicial review is tolerable only to the extent that the Supreme
Court operates as a disinterested decisionmaker, insulated as
far as humanly possible from the personal predilections of the
justices."0 7
According to these commentators, justices should not be inter-
ested in a particular result, only the (plain) meaning of the
Constitution. 08
While the desire to eliminate personal predilections does not
necessitate support of plain language textualism, the elimination
of personal predilections from constitutional interpretation is a
justification of plain language textualism.10 9 Indeed, inasmuch as
plain language textualism asserts the existence of only one possi-
ble meaning, relying on plain language textualism "necessarily"
eliminates or seeks to eliminate personal predilections.
DOES PLAIN LANGUAGE TEXTUALISM ELIMINATE
PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS?
The heart of this paper is the question whether plain lan-
guage eliminates or ensconces personal predilections. Ironically,
103. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 190, 236 (2002).
105. See White, supra note 97, at 532.
106. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
107. Emery G. Lee, III, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court's New Approach to Stare
Decisis in Constitutional Case, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 586 (2002).
108. Note that these commentators rely on their personal predilections in setting
forth the proper role of the Supreme Court. Certainly, the Constitution in no way
requires justices to be "disinterested," and only a subjective view of judicial review
requires the Court to act "objectively." And all of this discussion begs the question
whether the Supreme Court could "objectively" mete out "justice" as is perhaps im-
plied by the Preamble to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
109. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial
Decisionmaking, 91 VA. L. REV. 515, 523-524 (2005).
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the significance and importance of this question, varies depending
on the personal predilections of those who ask the question. For
those who believe that personal predilections cannot be elimi-
nated from constitutional interpretation, this question has an ob-
vious answer, that plain language textualism does not and cannot
eliminate personal predilections. By extension, for those who be-
lieve that constitutional interpretation necessarily includes per-
sonal predilections, the fact that plain language textualism cannot
eliminate those predilections does not in and of itself suggest that
plain language textualism is flawed or is otherwise an inappropri-
ate interpretational methodology.
What seems important in looking at this question is what the
plain language textualist values. Assume that the prior section
sufficiently proves that the plain language textualist values the
elimination of personal predilections and that plain language tex-
tualism is a better interpretive method because it eliminates per-
sonal predilections. If such textualism does not eliminate personal
predilections, then does textualism really provide any value to
such a textualist? Or, perhaps equally as important, if textualism
does not eliminate personal predilections, the plain language tex-
tualist cannot claim that textualism is superior to other interpre-
tive methods that also fail to eliminate personal predilections. At
the very least, the claim of interpretive superiority cannot be
based on the elimination of personal predilections.
The following sections will demonstrate that even plain lan-
guage textualism requires the use of significant personal choices,
i.e., predilections, before the Constitution can be interpreted as
"plain."
WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS "PLAIN" MEANINGS TO
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE?
Plain language textualism is premised on the idea that the
Constitution, or at least an identified section of it, has plain lan-
guage or a plain meaning. As previously noted, this implies that
only one such meaning can exist. This section points out that dif-
fering plain meanings often exist, strongly suggesting, to the dis-
interested observer, that perhaps none of the differing meanings
are so plain if different people assert the existence of more than
one such plain meaning. This article uses the Takings Clause to
illustrate this point.
Professor Andrew Schwartz suggests that the language of the
Takings Clause is plain to him, and his plain reading is that the
20081
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Takings Clause does no more than "protect against [the] govern-
ment's physical appropriation of property."110 J. Peter Byrne
writes that, "plainly," "the word 'take' denotes some change in pos-
session or title[,]""' and that "the regulatory takings doctrine...
rests on no textual . . . support."11 2 Professor Mark Tunick ex-
plains that in his "plain" view of the Takings Clause, "'does not
take property' is not 'do not regulate unfairly' or 'do [es] not fail to
promote social utility."'1 3 Put in the affirmative, "the plain mean-
ing" of the Takings Cause "requires only that government must
not 'take'-grasp, seize, lay hold of-property without paying just
compensation." 1 4 Putting "plain language" into context with the
compensation requirement William Michael Treavor, explains
(perhaps commands) that "the text" of the Takings Clause "tells [s]
us that regulations never give rise to a compensation
requirement." "15
Meanwhile, Professor Richard A. Epstein has urged a radi-
cally different "plain" meaning of the Takings Clause. As ex-
plained by Douglas T. Kendall and Charles P. Lord, "Epstein...
blithely contends . . . that the language of The Takings Clause
alone . . . renders suspect any interference with any strand in a
property owner's bundle of rights .... 116 Epstein "suggests" that
this conclusion is based on "the ordinary language of the text."117
Leif Warner, a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Shef-
field agrees with this analysis of Epstein. Warner also finds that
"Epstein believes" that "discoverable within the plain meaning of
the Takings Clause" is the principle that "state action triggers
110. Schwartz, supra note 79, at 38.
111. J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings and "Judicial Supremacy", 51 ALA. L.
REV. 949, 955 (2000).
112. Id. See also Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regula-
tory Takings and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 588 (2003) ("The plain
language of the Takings Clause.. .refers to neither eminent domain, physical appro-
priation, nor regulatory takings").
113. Tunick, supra note 55, at 886. Interestingly, Professor Tunick restates the
Takings Clause ("does not take property") in order to state what the Takings Clause
plainly means or does not mean. It seems as though a clause that is "plain" need not
be restated before giving its "plain meaning."
114. Id. See also Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth,
and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 881 (2000) (the "term 'take' most
naturally refers to an actual expropriation of property").
115. William Michael Treanor, Takings Law and the Regulatory State: A Response
to R.S. Radford, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 453, 458 (1995).
116. Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analy-
sis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 523
(1998).
117. Id.
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'takings' scrutiny if it alters any incident of any private parties
property bundle." 118
Plain language interpretation cannot be too plain if, as
shown, even plain language advocates fundamentally disagree as
to the plain meaning of the Takings Clause. Tunick limits his
"plain take" to physical possession of a physical thing, likening a
taking to "grasp[ing], seiz[ing], or lay[ing] hold of."119 While Byrne
agrees that "take" includes the physical, such as taking posses-
sion, he properly notes that the term "take" includes taking ti-
tle. 120 And, while these two versions of plain language are
somewhat consistent, Professor Epstein declares that the Takings
Clause has a third, but very different meaning that contradicts
the other two plain meanings.
Perhaps the existence of three plain meanings suggests the
non-existence of plain language. Indeed, these three "blithe[] con-
ten [tions] ,"121 without more, demonstrate the utter failure of plain
language textualism. The reasoning of these contentions cannot
be attacked because these contentions provide no reasoning. In-
stead, these contentions provide no more than a simple statement
of what each author maintains as "fact" or, at least, "law" or "The
Law." One can imagine a discussion between the three scholars as
little more than:
"The Takings Clause means [blank]."
"Does not."
"Does too."
Ultimately, an outside reader of a plain language interpreta-
tion cannot rationally argue with such an interpretation based the
interpreter's internal belief (or perhaps internal knowledge) as to
an eternal and plain meaning. The plain language textualist can-
not deny the internal source of this meaning, because the textual-
ist, in stating the plain meaning, refuses to create an external
record as to the source of the meaning. The source of meaning,
therefore, remains solely the person giving the interpretation. In
day to day life a person may cause personal conflicts by asserting
a certainty as to meaning of words without setting forth the ratio-
nale for this certainty, but generally, this belief absolutism has
few ramifications outside the life of the believer.
118. Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1923, 1937 (1997).
119. Tunick, supra note 55.
120. Byrne, supra note 111, at 955.
121. Kendall & Lord, supra note 116, at 523.
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Constitutional interpretation is different. Suppose the com-
mentators were instead members of the Supreme Court. Consider
an opinion that might be given in a Takings Clause case.
Justice Tunick: "The Takings Clause plainly means grasping,
seizing, or holding a tangible object."
Justice Byrne: "Justice Tunick is partially correct, but the Tak-
ings Clause also plainly means taking of title to property."
Justice Epstein: "Justices Byrne and Tunick may think they are
partially correct, but the Takings Clause plainly includes inter-
ference with property rights."
Justice Kendall, with whom Justice Lord concurs: "Justice Ep-
stein's opinion is merely a blithe contention."
Plain language textualism, although prestidigitized with
hopes of eliminating personal predilections instead, ensconces
them. Indeed, plain language textualism epitomizes using per-
sonal predilections in constitutional interpretation.
Some have attacked the judiciary as being a sort of "priest-
hood" that believes only the priesthood can "render [the Constitu-
tion] intelligible," 122 and plain language textualism renders the
judiciary most like a priesthood where the justices read the "sa-
cred text"123 and declare the meaning. Such an approach requires
no rationalization, no explanation, just, "The Founder's wrote it. I
restated it. And that settles it."
This article does not choose the "correct" plain meaning of the
Takings Clause. Instead, the article points out that each plain lan-
guage textualist declares language to be plain. Plain language tex-
tualism declares what is. Plain requires no analysis. Either the
language is plain or it is not. Either all agree as to the plain mean-
ing or they do not. Those who plainly see yellow flowers will never
see blue flowers. Those who see the blue ones will never see the
yellow. This discussion demonstrates a fundamental flaw in plain
language textualism.
Plain language textualism cannot be used to resolve a dispute
between two people who claim two different plain meanings. Each
must either explicitly or implicitly assert the invalidity of the
other relying on nothing more than Because-I-Said-So interpre-
122. Philip P. Houle, Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Ec-
onomic Liberty and the Constitution, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 55 (1989).
123. Anthony V. Baker, "So Extraordinary, So Unprecedented an Authority": A
Conceptual Reconsideration of the Singular Doctrine of Judicial Review, 39 DUQ. L.
REV. 729, 732 n.17. Cf, Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY 287-288 (1932).
[Vol. 25374
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss2/3
ANIMAL FARM JURISPRUDENCE
tive methodology. The first must reject the meaning asserted by
the second based solely on the first's belief that the first correctly
understands the plain meaning of the term while the second mis-
understands the term. This discussion of differing plain meanings
demonstrates that the only basis for determining a plain language
definition is resort to the internal thoughts of the textualist. The
plain language textualist simply states that some clause of the
Constitution is plain, and others either see the same meaning or
they do not. They cannot rely on the persuasiveness of the analy-
sis, rationale, or argument of the textualist, because none exist.
This discussion scenario points out the futility of determining the
validity or correctness of a plain language definition based on
plain language methodology. Indeed, inasmuch as plain language
textualism provides no methodology it is impossible to determine
whether plain language textualism has been properly applied.
Plain language textualism has flaws other than the inability
to test whether the methodology has been properly used. In partic-
ular, and perhaps more important, plain language textualism is
inconsistent with its core justification-the elimination of per-
sonal predilections. As noted, the mere selection of an actual, de-
clared plain meaning can vary from person to person. The
discussion of the various meanings of the Takings Clause demon-
strates this. What the article next seeks to demonstrate is that
before a person declares the language of a clause of the Constitu-
tion to be plain, the interpreter must make a variety of implicit or
explicit choices, choices based on the personal predilections of the
interpreter, the plain language textualist.
WHICH PLAIN LANGUAGE DOES THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE TEXTUALIST USE: "LAY,"
"ORDINARY," OR "LEGAL"?
Commentators regularly refer to the Constitution as a "legal
text."1 24 Some further modify the description by referring to the
Constitution as an "authoritative legal text[ ]."125 In order to em-
phasize the authoritativeness and legal nature of the text, some
124. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1737,
1802 (2007); Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia:
Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 489, 516 (2007).
125. Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 7, 16 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism,
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 471 (2006).
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even liken the Constitution to the Bible, 126 even suggesting that
the two have an equivalent "sacred character."'127 One conclusion
that follows would be that the Constitution should be interpreted
as a legal text or a legal document. What this means may not be so
clear. Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman recently asked, "What as-
sumptions is [the interpreter of the Constitution] going to make
when interpreting a legal text?"128 This is, of course, a continuing
question of interpretive theory. Indeed, "[w]e as a society, or as a
legal culture, have not even agreed on a methodology for interpre-
tation of legal texts."129 Thus, in some ways, noting that the Con-
stitution is "authoritative" or a "legal text" does little to answer
the question as to how best to interpret it.
The particular problem that is not answered is what kind of
"plain" language should the plain language interpreter use. It may
be that "judges are professionally trained to interpret legal
text.' 30 Presumably, this means that lawyers are trained to look
at legal documents a different way, in the way that a "doctor reads
a medical text differently form the way an ordinary person reads a
novel.' 31 These assumptions or conclusions, in and of themselves,
do not answer the question of where to find meaning in a word or
phrase.
Some seek to provide the answer by suggesting that a legal
text requires interpretation based on the "plain"132 or "ordi-
126. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Western Law, 54
ARK. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001); Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and
Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneu-
tics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 511-12 (1998). But see generally Francis J. Mootz, III,
Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious is Plausible, 61 TENN.
L. REV. 69, 127-31 (1993).
127. Michael Sink, Restoring our Ancient Constitutional Faith, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
921, 932 (2004).
128. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 70 (2006).
129. Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial "Merit" Selec-
tion, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 816 (2004).
130. Damien M. Schiff, Purposivism and the "Reasonable Legislator": A Review Es-
say of Justice Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1081, 1088
n.44 (2007).
131. M. H. Hoeflich, The Lawyer as Pragmatic Reader: The History of Legal Com-
mon-Placing, 55 ARK. L. REV. 87, 89 (2002).
132. Rev. Robert John Araujo, S.J., Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom
and the Search for the Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 Miss. L.J. 225 n.69 (1998);
Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48
VILL. L. REV. 305, 309 (2003).
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nary"133 meaning of a word. But if that is true then what is the
point of suggesting that any particular document is a 'legal text?"
Presumably, newspapers are read based on the plain and ordinary
meaning of the words. And if newspapers and legal texts use the
same method of interpretation, then what is the point of legal edu-
cation? More to the point, why bother describing a document as a
legal text, if that declaration does not affect the meaning of the
words?
These questions matter because some believe/argue/assert
that words have a "legal meaning."134 Others assert that words
have "lay" meanings. 135 Indeed, other meanings to words include
"natural" and "common." The problem for the "plain" language
textualist is that some interchange "plain" with "ordinary." Even
more difficult is that some textualists assert that a legal text looks
to "plain" or "ordinary" meanings. While others make it clear that
legal meanings and lay meanings are very different and use of one
rather than the other may create drastically different results. 36
Undeniably, words have both legal and lay meanings. Some assert
that constitutional interpretation be based on the "legal" meaning
of a word. Others assert that it must be based on the lay meaning.
The existence of these various forms of meanings has dire
consequences for the plain language textualist. Such a textualist
must surreptitiously choose one form of meaning, whether it be
"lay" or "legal." Such a surreptitious choice seems incongruous
with the assertion that language is plain. Openly making the
choice, openly contradicts the assertion that the language is plain.
Finally, not recognizing the existence of the difference may be the
worst yet.
133. Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 693
(2005). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE
L.J. 1719, 1725 n.94 (2006).
134. Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of "Commerce" in the Commerce
Clause, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 789 (2006). See, e.g., Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Consti-
tution in the Glass Case and Constitutions in Action, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 397, 397-98
(1998); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Con-
stitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1201-02 (2003); Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523-24 (2003).
135. See, e.g., Sam Erman, Word Games: Raising and Resolving the Shortcomings
in Accident-Insurance Doctrine that Autoerotic-Asphyxiation Cases Reveal, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 2172, 2175 n.13 (2005); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, "Public
Use," and the Conundrum of Original Intent, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 72 (1996).
136. See Robert Ryan Morishita, Patent Infringement After GATT: What is an Offer
to Sell?, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 905 passim (1997).
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This discussion as to choosing between "lay" and "legal," al-
beit "plain," meanings demonstrates an internal failure of plain
meaning textualism, particularly with regard to constitutional in-
terpretation. First, the lay/legal choice cannot be found in the text.
The Constitution does not refer to any interpretive methodology
nor does it demand that the interpreter use lay or legal language.
So the textualist leaves the text to choose a lay or legal approach.
Having looked beyond the text to make that choice, the textualist
then asserts a meaning which the textualist claims is to be found
on the surface of the text. Second, the lay/legal choice is clearly not
obvious. There is no evidence that most people involved in the rat-
ification process, from drafters to delegates to the Constitutional
Convention to the delegates to the ratifying conventions to the
voters were lawyers or understood legal language. The Federalist
Papers sought to convince the lay voter to support the ratification
of the Constitution. Perhaps this indicates that the document
should be interpreted using lay understanding of words. Third,
and perhaps most important, the choice is a personal predilection
to the textualist. The textualist must necessarily base choice of lay
or legal language on personal predilections. In other words does
the vote for persons to the ratification conventions indicate using
lay language or does the formalized ratification process demand
using legal language? The question whether to use lay or legal
language could be guided by a variety of other factors, but
whatever those factors in making that choice the language of the
Constitution says nothing about using lay or legal language. In
the end the plain language textualist must make a variety of ex-
tra-textual choices before ultimately choosing to use a lay or legal
approach to interpreting the plain language of the Constitution.
Each such choice is based on the personal predilections of the
plain language textualist.
LEGAL AND LAY MEANINGS TO THE WORDS OF
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE LEAD TO DIFFERENT
MEANINGS
The difference between choosing a lay meaning approach and
a legal meaning approach substantially affects the final interpre-
tation of a constitutional provision. A review of the plain language
of the Takings Clause will demonstrate the conflict between lay
and legal meanings. This conflict will demonstrate the signifi-
cance of choosing between a lay and legal approach to textual in-
terpretation. As noted above, the most common plain meanings to
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the Takings Clause are (1) taking possession of a physical thing or
(2) taking title to a physical thing, or (3) both. The question is
whether any one if these both works and uses a consistent ap-
proach to the question of lay or legal language. The following dis-
cussion demonstrates that if the lay approach is used, the Takings
Clause must be limited to the physical appropriation of a physical
thing, and if the legal approach is used the textualist must drasti-
cally limit the meaning of the words.
To overview, the Takings Clause requires compensation if
"private property" is "taken for public use." The lay understanding
of "take" implies physical possession, and the lay understanding of
"property" is limited to a physical thing.137 "Most lay people be-
lieve the term 'property' means a tangible or intangible thing.' 3 8
Others urge, "Tangible property, both real and personal, still
forms the core of the lay conception of private property.' 39 The
lay meaning of the Takings Clause, i.e., limiting the words to the
lay meaning, is limited to the requirement that "just compensa-
tion" be paid if the government takes physical possession. This
meaning, however, creates a problem for the most common form of
taking of property, the condemnation of property. In a condemna-
tion, the government takes "title." But "title" does not fall within
the lay meaning of property. "Title" is within a legal meaning to
the term property. Limited strictly to the lay understanding of the
words, the Takings Clause would not require payment when the
government takes title, only when it takes possession. Of course,
no one (so far as the article can determine) seriously suggests that
any meaning of the Takings Clause is limited to taking posses-
sion. The only conclusion is that the "plain meaning" of the Tak-
ings Clause must be based legal understandings of words. This
approach is certainly consistent with the conclusion that the Con-
stitution is a legal text.
Before turning to the legal meanings of the words of the Tak-
ings Clause, another problem with using the lay interpretation
must be addressed. For the moment the discussion concedes that
137. See, e.g., Brian J. Nolan, The Metaphysics of Property: Looking Beneath the
Surface of Regulatory Takings Law After Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 703, 751 (2004).
138. Vada Waters Lindsey, Casebook Review, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 977, 978
(1999) (reviewing EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KwALL, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1992)).
139. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1174 (1999). See also Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability,
26 IND. L. REV. 519, 552 (1993).
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the individual words "property" and "taken" would only require
compensation when the government takes possession or title. The
plain language textualist would, presumably, claim victory. But
the textualist must first recognize that occasionally words that in-
dividually have one meaning, but when placed together, they have
a different meaning, i.e., phrases often have an idiomatic mean-
ing. So the real question is not whether the plain language textu-
alist "correctly" identifies the lay understanding of the two words
"taken" and "property" but whether the plain language textualist
correctly identifies the lay understanding of the Takings Clause.
What if it could be demonstrated that the lay understanding of the
Takings Clause is that property owners must be compensated
whenever the government seeks to control the use of private prop-
erty? The plain language textualist must then argue that the
plain meaning of the Takings Clause is based on the plain (lay)
meaning of the words "taken" and "property," but not on the plain
(lay) meaning of the "Takings Clause." An alternative would be
that that lay understanding of the words "taken" and "property"
can (must?) be used because those understandings are "plain," but
the lay understanding of the "Takings Clause" cannot (must not)
be used because that understanding is not "plain." One question
presented is whether an idiomatic understanding of words can
ever be plain. Alternatively, whether plain language interpreta-
tion can rely on lay plain meaning of words, but not lay plain
meaning of the entire clause.
In the end the plain language textualist using a lay language
approach must make a number of language choices which lead to
different meanings. As noted earlier, even if a lay approach is lim-
ited to lay understanding of individual words, the textualist runs
into a serious conundrum. Lay meaning limiting property to a
physical object does not, using lay terms, include taking title
(without possession) via eminent domain.
So the textualist must choose to use the legal meaning of the
words in order to find the plain meaning of the "Takings Clause."
This discussion of the legal meaning of the words of the Takings
Clause begins with the word "take." For example, title to property
(a word to be discussed later) can be taken in a variety of ways to
"take" title. Title can be taken under a will. 140 An obvious way to
take title is through purchase, including purchase at a sheriffs
140. See generally Robinson v. Armistead, 2 Va. Colonial Dec. B223, 1737 WL *4
(Gen. Ct. 1737).
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sale. 141 Title may be taken by power. 142 Title may also be taken by
force. Whereas it may no longer be true, in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury there was a time when belligerents in war or privateers could
take title by capture and sale in a neutral port. 143 Similarly, and
more commonly, title may also be "taken" by adverse posses-
sion. 44 As it relates to title, a taking infers more of a reception or
obtaining, and while a person may "take" (or obtain) title by pos-
session, a person may take (or obtain) title by virtue of other phys-
ical acts or deeds. In that sense the term "take" has nothing to do
with possession. A thief takes possession without taking title, and
at a real estate closing the new owner usually takes title without
taking actual possession at the moment of the closing. Indeed, the
process of condemnation is a "taking" of title before taking of
possession.
For the purposes of this discussion, the significant question is
whether the legal meaning of "take" must be limited to these ideas
of taking physical control of the property or actual or constructive
title. As noted above, many commentators seek to limit the "plain"
meaning of the Takings Clause to these ideas. More important,
they seek to eliminate any meaning of the Takings Clause which
would support Regulatory Takings jurisprudence. These commen-
tators recognize that Epstein seeks to demonstrate that his under-
standing of the Takings Clause, justifies the regulatory takings
jurisprudence. They also each suggest that he is simply wrong. As
put by Kendall and Lord, "There is... no way to justify Epstein's
conclusion as flowing from the text of the Takings Clause.' 1 45
Kendall and Lord attack Epstein's interpretation from positions of
certitude. For example, after they assert that "[a]ccording to Ep-
stein, a 'taking' has occurred whenever the government 'dimin-
ishes the rights of the owner in any fashion,"' they confidently
assert that "the word 'take' does not mean 'diminish' today, and
there is no evidence that it ever did."1 46 Certitudinal argument,
however, has its flaws. A chink in the armor is, essentially, de-
141. See generally Johnson ex dem. Tuthill v. Dubois, 4 Johns. 216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1809).
142. See generally Prescott v. Trueman, 4 Mass. 627, 1808 WL 1194 (1 Tyng 1808).
143. See generally Wheelwright v. Depegster, 1 Johns. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
144. See generally Trowbridge v. Royce, 1 Root 50, 1772 WL 1 (Conn. 1772).
145. Kendall & Lord, supra note 114, at 524 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 57 (Harvard Univ. Press
1985)).
146. E.g., Commonwealth v. Herrick, 60 Mass. 465, 468, 1850 WL 4609, at *2-*3
(1850). See also Croft v. Arthur, 3 S.C. Eq. 223, 1811 WL 316 (Ct. App. 3 Des. Eq.
1811); The Oxford English Dictionary Vol. 17, 557-73 (2d ed. 2000) (1989).
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struction of the protection of certitude. In this case, the Oxford
English Dictionary disagrees with Kendall and Lord. This diction-
ary has no fewer than 15 pages of definitions, examples and dis-
cussion of the word "take."147 Most importantly for these
purposes, one of the dozens of definitions of "take" is: "To detract
from, lessen, diminish."'14
Kendall and Lord also demand that readers accept their
statement that "alter" and "take" cannot be used interchangea-
bly.149 While the words may or may not have exactly the same
connotation and denotation, they can be used to convey similar
ideas. As argued by a lawyer nearly two hundred years ago in a
case concerning legislative power over property: "No legislature
has a right to interfere with, alter or take away private property
... without making a compensation to the person from whom it is
taken."150 Undoubtedly, Kendall and Lord would urge that this
Nineteenth Century lawyer, born in the age of the creation of our
country, was wrong then and would be wrong today. And their
proof would be that he was "plainly" wrong.
It may be that "take" and "alter" do not have exactly the same
meaning. This may also be said for "take" and "diminish." For the
purposes of this paper, the exact meaning of "take" is irrelevant.
The point is that commentators and courts regularly refer to the
"plain" meaning or understanding of the Takings Clause. It has
been shown that people have very different understandings of
what they "plainly" understand by the words of the "Takings
Clause." With regard to the word "take," the apparently simplest
of the words in the Takings Clause, Corpus Juris explains that it
"has very many shades of meaning[;] [t]he precise meaning which
is to bear in any case depends upon the subject in respect to which
it is used."''1 1 The Oxford English Dictionary best describes how to
understand the word take: "It is one of the elemental words of the
language, of which the only direct explanation is to show the thing
or action to which they are applied."1 52
The legal meaning of the word "take" is further complicated,
because outside the area of modern Takings Clause jurisprudence,
courts have recognized the existence of non-physical takings. In
147. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY Vol. 17, 557-73 (2d ed. 2000) (1989).
148. Id. at 565. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Herrick, 60 Mass. 465, 468 (1850).
149. Kendall & Lord, supra note 114, at 524.
150. Partridge v. Dorsey's Lessee, 3 H. & J. 302, 1813 WL 277, at *4 (Md. 1813).
151. 41 WORDS AND PHRASES 14 (1965) (referring to "take").
152. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 147, at 557.
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particular, a taking can occur constructively. For two centuries,
the courts within the United States have recognized "constructive
taking."153 American courts in the Nineteenth Century found con-
structive taking by a defendant may give rise to a suit by the
owner of the property. 54 Alternatively, an owner's constructive
possession of property, according to Nineteenth Century courts,
may support an action for trespass. 155 Some of these courts held
that possession of goods may be considered a constructive taking
sufficient to support a crime based on unlawful taking. 56 At the
same time they recognized constructive possession of property.157
More important, a Nineteenth Century Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision noted the interrelationship of property to "un-
restricted enjoyment" and that there is little difference between
"actual taking" and "constructive taking away the right to present
use."158 To return to the legal meaning of "take," the plain legal
meaning of the word includes far more than taking physical pos-
session of a physical thing, and includes more than the obtaining
of title.
Once again the point of this discussion is to demonstrate that
if the plain language textualist asserts that the meaning of the
Takings Clause based on the plain legal meaning of the word take,
the textualist has taken a very complex term and declared it to be
simple and also obvious. Only the personal choice, i.e., personal
predilection, of the textualist permits the textualist to eliminate
all possible legal meanings of the word take other than the one
indicating either the exercise of physical possession or the ob-
taining of title.
Assuming that the meaning of "take" has a "plain (legal)
meaning," the next question is whether "property" also has a
"plain (legal) meaning." To ask this question seems to answer it.
Most law students take a year to study the nuances of the word
property. Entire treatises attempt to explain the meaning of the
153. E.g., Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 147, 150 (1 Tyng 1819).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Root v. Chandler, 10 Wend. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
156. See State v. Vickery, 19 Tex. 326 (1857); Fulton v. State, 13 Ark. 168 (1852).
157. See, e.g., Princeton Bank v. Crozer, 22 N.J. L. 383 (1850). There are, of course,
other constructive acts in law related to property and titles such as constructive no-
tice, e.g., Hatton v. McClish, 6 Md. 407 (1854) and constructive delivery, e.g., Moses v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 32 N.H. 523 (1856). The curious reader who has made it to this
parenthetical may also ask why Chief Justice Marshall did not find a way to hold that
there had been "constructive delivery" of Marbury's commission. See generally Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
158. Welsh v. Bell, 32 Pa. 12 (1858).
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word. One conclusion that is "plain" to many property scholars is
that property and things are not the same. As simply explained by
the 1984 edition of the Property hornbook, "For the lawyer, 'prop-
erty' is not a 'thing,' although 'things' are the subject of prop-
erty."159 According to the hornbook a "layman" who "say[s] that
'property' is something tangible" has "confuse[d] 'property' with
the various subjects of 'property'."160 Property, then, is an idea,
completely intangible. As put by Jeremy Benthan, property "is not
material it is metaphysical, it is a mere conception of the mind."161
In particular, Benthan urged that property is an idea born from
and surviving only in law.' 62 "Before laws were made there was no
property; take away laws, and property ceases."' 63
Chief Justice Marshall, in 1830, stated, in a widely-followed
opinion, 64 "[t]he term 'property,' as applied to lands comprehends
every species of title inchoate or complete. It is supposed to em-
brace those rights which lie in contract; those which are execu-
tory; as well as those which are executed."' 65 Perhaps more
broadly, courts have also "construe [d] the term property as includ-
ing every species of valuable vested interest."1 66 In particular, as
to the deprivation of property, property is one of "the three great
subdivisions of all civil right"' 67 and "embraces all valuable inter-
159. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1 (Hornbook Series
Lawyer's Edition 1984).
160. Id. (emphasis in original)
161. JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY 4 (8th ed. 2002) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM,
THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, Part I, 111-13 (Dumont ed.,
Hildreth trans. 1864)).
162. CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 161, at 4-5.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Prior to 1870, the Supreme Court quoted Marshall's words at least three
times. See HORNSBY V. U.S., 77 U.S. 224, 242 (1869); POLLARD'S HEIRS V. KIBBE, 39
U.S. 353, 390 (1840); Smith v. Unites States, 35 U.S. 326, 330 (1836). State courts also
regularly cited to or used the same definition. See IowA HOMESTEAD Co. V. WEBSTER
COUNTY, 21 Iowa 221, 1866 WL 286, at *7 (1866); Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387, 421
(1862); Stockdale v. Treasurer of Webster County, 12 Iowa 536, 1861 WL 326, at *1
(1861); PUGET SOUND AGRIC. CO. V. PIERCE COUNTY, 1 Wash. Terr. 159, 170, 1861 WL
333, at *7 (1861); Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 24 (1861); Figg v. Snook, 9
Ind. 202, 1857 WL 3586, at *1 (1857); Mussina v. Alling, 11 La. Ann. 568, 1856 WL
4589, at *25 (. 1856); Jones v. Menard, 1 Tex. 771, 1847 WL 3504, at *10 (1847);
Eslava v. Doe, 7 Ala. 543, 1845 WL 3, at *8 (1845).
165. Soulard v. United States, 29 U.S. 511, 512 (1830).
166. Parks v. Boston, 32 Mass. 198, 203 (15 Pick. 1834) (emphasis added). See also
Bd. of Educ. of Normal Sch. Dist. v. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025, 1027 (Ill. 1895); Territory
ex rel. Wade v. Ashenfelter, 12 P. 879, 898 (N.M. 1887); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.
620, 630-32 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting); Chi. & E. Ill. R.R. Co. v. Englewood Con-
necting Ry. Co., 17 Ill. App. 141, 143, 1885 WL 8359, at *4 (App. Ct. 1904).
167. McGrew v. Indust. Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938).
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ests which a man my possess outside of himself."168 "In an ad-
vanced civilization like ours, a very large portion of the property of
individuals . . . consists of rights and claims against others, or
against the government itself."169 "Property is defined as the high-
est right a man can have to anything, being used for that right
which one hath to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no
way depend on a man's courtesy,"1 70 and it "embrace[s]" "all titles
... legal or equitable, perfect or imperfect,"171 as well as, "things
in action [and] in possession, including things both real and per-
sonal, promissory notes and money.1 72 In the late Twentieth Cen-
tury, the Supreme Court often described property as a bundle of
rights.1 73 Prior to that century courts often referred to "rights of
property."174 Among those "rights" are "the exclusive right of pos-
sessing, enjoying, and disposing of, a thing"1 75 or the "free use,
enjoyment, and disposal.' 76 These may even imply the right to
acquire property. 177 "Property" includes judgments178 and an in-
terest in a mining claim.' 79
At this point the article does not seek to prove that any or all
or a combination of all these ideas defines "property." Instead, the
article points out that according to the plain language textualist,
none of these cases matter. To the textualist, the words of prop-
erty scholars might be deceiving in their effort to urge a difference
between property and things or their effort to demonstrate that
property is a set of rights, but deceptive or not, the words of these
scholars are not relevant. The plain language textualist need not
demonstrate that these property scholars err in their understand-
ing of property concepts. Similarly, the plain language textualist
must look at the extensive definition of property in Black's Law
168. Campbell, 115 U.S. 620 at 630 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See
also McGrew, 85 P.2d 608 at 610.
169. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025at 1027.
170. Dow v. Curry Silver Mining Co., 31 Cal. 629, 637 (1867) (citations omitted).
171. HORNSBY V. U.S., 77 U.S. 224, 242 (1869).
172. Cate v. Cranor, 30 Ind. 292, 1868 WL 3081, at *1 (1868). See also Mitchell, 35
Miss. 108, 1858 WL 3057, at *4 (Miss. Err. &Ct. App. 1858) ("[T]here can be no doubt
but that money is embraced in the legal term property.").
173. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982).
174. E.g., Respublica v. Dore, 1 Yeates 501, 1795 WL 2 (Pa. 1795); State v. Van
Waggoner, 6 N.J.L. 374, 1797 WL 629, at *2 (1797).
175. Banning v. Sibley, 3 Minn. 389, 1859 WL 389, at *9 (1859).
176. Stevens v. State, 2 Ark. 291, 1840 WL 267, at *2 (1840).
177. Id.
178. Adams v. Hackett, 7 Cal. 187, 1857 WL 688, at *203 (1857).
179. California v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56, 1859 WL 56 (1859).
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Dictionary, a definition which incorporates many of these prior-
discussed ideas,180 declare that Black's is wrong, that the meaning
of "property" plainly does not incorporate the multifarious and
subtle meanings of property. The article does not suggest that
these multiple meanings of "property" demand that a taking oc-
curs whenever and however a regulation impacts a property right.
Indeed, many of the cases which recognize the complexity of the
term "property" also recognized the police power of the state may
occasionally eliminate these rights without compensation.18 1 The
point is that all these connotations and denotations revolving
around and in "property" are irrelevant to the plain language tex-
tualist. To such a person "property" is no more complex than sug-
gesting that "property" is, has been and always will be the same
whenever eight black marks on the page known as letters are put
in the same order to create what the English language calls a
word; that word being "property."
But even the plain language textualist's desire for simplicity
cannot quite get the textualist to urge a single definition of "prop-
erty." So, rather than embrace the complexity of property, the
plain language textualist relies on the (relative) "plainness" of two
meanings. As set forth above, one plain (legal) meaning to prop-
erty is the "thing" referred to. Of course, that meaning belongs to
the "confused" layman.18 2 The other plain (legal) meaning is that
"property" means "title." Given that the legal definition or mean-
ing of property often revolves around title, that could, perhaps be
an appropriate definition to "property." On the other hand the Su-
preme Court of Florida responded to an effort to equate property
and title by stating, "[t]o so hold, it seems to us, would cut down
the larger word 'property' to the narrow word 'title,' and say to the
makers of the [Florida] Constitution: 'You were ignorant of the
meanings of the two words."' 18 3
Even equating "title" and "property" still does not assist the
plain language textualist in demonstrating that the meaning of
the Takings Clause is plain. A "take title" meaning to the Takings
Clause recognizes that "taking" "plainly" includes more than phys-
ical possession of things but at the same time suffers from inher-
ent inconsistency. According to the plain meaning advocated, to
"take property" means to "take property" and to "take title." This
180. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1232-34 (7th ed. 1999).
181. See, e.g., Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357 (1788).
182. CUNNINGHAM ET AL, supra note 159.
183. Florida Citrus Exch. v. Grisham, 61 So. 123, 124 (Fla. 1913).
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approach begins by asserting that "Take" (plainly, perhaps obvi-
ously) means "to take." At the same time, the second half of this
"plain" language approach rewrites the Takings Clause in the
name of plain meaning, equating "property" with "title," while at
the same time equating "property" with, well, "property." So under
this plain meaning of the Takings Clause, "take" has one meaning,
but the correct, i.e., "plain," understanding of the word "property"
includes two plain meanings. "Property" means "property," i.e.,
the "thing" spoken of, and "property" also means "title" to that
same thing. So for the plain language textualist, "property" and
"title" are both incorporated into the term "property." Property
and title are interchangeable, but perhaps different. Plain lan-
guage textualism incongruously asserts that language is plain and
at the same time subject to two, but only two, meanings. Undenia-
bly, "property" includes "title," but the two concepts are far from
synonymous. The "take title" plain meaning is no more "plain" nor
accurate than the "take possession" plain meaning of the Takings
Clause.
While proving the non-existence of an argument may be im-
possible, the conclusion here is that the take possession version of
the plain meaning Takings Clause is consistent with any possible
understanding of the Takings Clause 184 as is the take title version
of the Takings Clause. As pointed out earlier, it may be even more
consistent with a plain meaning Takings Clause, in that "title" is
undoubtedly one form of or type of "property" in a physical thing,
and therefore consistent with the plain (legal) meaning of the
word, i.e., the concept of property. Limiting the Takings Clause to
taking title, is, as pointed out, not plainly required by the word
"property," an idea that encompasses far more than the limited
ideas of possession or title.
This discussion points to the inconsistencies in concluding
that that the Takings Clause contains plain language. Such a con-
Clusion requires asserting that the word property includes both
the thing and title, but none of the other myriad of aspects to prop-
erty. At the same time that plain language textualism broadens
the word "property" to include two distinct ideas, "things" and "ti-
184. This does not mean that the Court has always held that all possessory takings
are indeed compensable takings. See generally Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987) (the Court, while finding a taking in that case, held that the govern-
ment could, under the proper circumstances, take possession-or at least effective
possession of property-without paying compensation if it had a good enough reason
to do so).
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tle," it (at least implicitly) restricts the word title to title in fee
simple absolute. For example, suppose the government were to
completely obliterate the air rights over a piece of land when title
to the air rights belonged to someone other than the person with
title to the underlying land.18 5 The two plain language versions of
the Takings Clause ask two questions. One is whether such a reg-
ulation "takes" possession, and the answer is clearly no. The sec-
ond question is whether the regulation takes title, and again the
answer is no. But if the answer is no, then prohibition on any and
all use of land would also not be a taking, because the regulation
takes neither title nor possession. On the other hand, if the prohi-
bition on any use of land, i.e., property, is effectively (or construc-
tively) taking the thing, i.e., land, or title, then prohibition an any
use of separately titled air rights should also be a taking. Alterna-
tively, the plain language textualist must now account for title in
something less than the fee, or perhaps one more time amend the
plain meaning to refer to title in fee simple absolute and not title
in any lesser property, including title in such things as an ease-
ment or mineral rights. In the end the plain language textualist
has used a variety of personal predilections not to elucidate the
meaning of the Takings Clause, but to limit it to the simplest of
possible meanings. The plain language textualist has once again
ensconced personal predilections in the name of eliminating them.
In sum, the plain language textualist relies on personal predi-
lections in choosing a legal or lay version of the Takings Clause.
Once having chosen such a version (at least implicitly) the plain
language textualist then must either ignore very narrow (purport-
edly) lay verision of property, i.e., that property is limited to
"things," or take a very complex and subtle legal term "property"
and limit it to title, but only fee simple absolute title. And even if
the plain language textualist asserts a different limited and plain
meaning to "property" such an effort necessarily must make such
choices without reference to constitutional text, i.e., through per-
sonal predilections. The plain language meaning of the Takings
Clause, then, is a personal construct of the textualist who asserts
that textualism is a superior form of constitutional analysis, be-
cause it eliminates personal predilections.
185. This, of course, was true in the Penn Central case. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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THE FINAL HYPOCRISY: PRINCIPLES BEHIND
PLAIN LANGUAGE TEXTUALISM
To this point this article has discussed application flaws to
plain language textualism as applied to the Takings Clause. Some
of these application flaws could, perhaps, be addressed and cor-
rected. For example, plain language textualism could be applied
consistently, to individual rights, liberties and property as well as
to government powers and immunities. Other application errors
cannot truly be connected. Where two persons disagree as to the
plain meaning of the text, as is apparently true for the Takings
Clause, no resort to plain language textualism will provide a basis
for picking which of the two "plain meanings" is the true "plain
meaning." Put in these terms, plain language textualism is a truly
personal approach to constitutional law.
Even where there is no opposing "plain meaning," resort to
plain meaning textualism is often a very personal approach to in-
terpretation. The plain language textualist is, almost of necessity,
urging that what cannot be seen as obvious can be seen clearly by
the textualist. With regard to the Takings Clause, for example, it
is obvious to the plain language textualist, that taking is limited
to physical possession or taking title notwithstanding decades of
jurisprudence to the contrary and, more important, notwithstand-
ing what appears to be a very, very specific rejection by all prop-
erty scholars of the idea that property is a thing to be possessed or
at least is not limited to a thing to be possessed.
Where there is debate as to the meaning of a word or phrase
or clause in the Constitution, resort to plain language textualism
is a foreclosing argument or an effort to foreclose debate. It is a
statement of certitude for which there is no adequate response, at
least as to the plain language textualist. A response of "I don't see
it that way" earns from the plain language textualist something
akin to, "The fact that you don't see what is plainly there does not
change what is plainly there." A response that the meaning should
be looked at in light of anything other than the text earns a re-
sponse akin to, "Reliance or such matters is an effort to amend the
plain language." There is, consequently, no effective response.
Plain language textualism, then, is more often a statement of
truth not argument, and unless all people (or at least all reasona-
ble people) agree, this "truth" comes from the individual or indi-
viduals speaking it. It is a purely personal truth which all are
asked to believe. This personal aspect to plain language textual-
ism makes it a fundamentally inappropriate form of analysis ex-
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cept when, indeed all agree on the plain language textualist's
interpretation. In which case it is a statement of fact.
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY OF PLAIN LANGUAGE
TEXTUALISM
Except where plain language textualism leads to a result that
all agree on (which is not the result with the Taking's Clause),
plain language textualism is inconsistent with its own fundamen-
tal purpose. Plain language textualists purport to rely on an ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation that leads away from a
personalized constitution, away from a constitution based on per-
sonal predilections. Unless all agree on the meaning of a word,
phrase or clause of the Constitution, plain language textualism is
nothing but a personalized constitution, although, of course, many
individuals may agree with this personalized constitution.
To the extent that plain language textualism may otherwise
be an appropriate constitutional tool, its legitimacy as a definitive
tool is utterly undermined by its internal inconsistency. Plain lan-
guage textualism claims to root out a personalized approach to
constitutional interpretation by relying on what necessarily may
be a personalized approach.
The goal of plain language textualism, rather, the raison
d'etre of plain language textualism is to eliminate personal predi-
lections. It does with a tone of superiority, i.e., the answer is
"plain" and therefore unchallengeable. Because the answer if
"plain," the meaning is clear, non-debatable. A challenge to the
plain meaning is an effort to turn the black (i.e., black letter) into
gray. Such an effort, by necessity, plain language textualist would
urge, is an effort to insert personal values into the constitution.
The insertion of personal values is inappropriate, it is just plain
wrong, suggests the plain language textualist. Indeed, the very
purpose of plain language textualism is to eliminate the personal,
e.g., personal values, personal predilections, etc. Implicit in the
purported value and purpose of plain language textualism is that
"personal" approaches to the Constitution are clearly to be avoided
and are inherently suspect if not void on their face.
Because plain language textualism violates its own core pre-
mise, it is inappropriate as a single, binding constitutional inter-
pretational approach. Any effort at applying plain language
textualism demands a personal approach to the Constitution. This
problem manifests itself at the beginning of an interpretation
when two would-be constitutional interpreters finding two differ-
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ent "plain" meanings from the same text. As noted, plain language
textualism has been urged to have two very different meanings
with regard to the Takings Clause. The plain language textualism
appears to have two very different meanings if one looks at the
plain meaning of "property" from the perspective of a lay person as
opposed to a Property scholar. A plain language textualist would
be required to choose between the meaning as understood by a lay
person as opposed to meaning as understood by a Property
scholar. This requires a "personal" choice, perhaps predilection.
Beyond the personal problems created by seeking or finding
different meanings to be plain, is the far more difficult problem of
deciding when to apply plain language. Again, as noted before,
those urging applying textualism to the Takings Clause, do not
urge application to the Preamble, Sovereign Immunity, or The
Commerce Clause. Plain language textualism cannot be used to
explain a choice as to when and to what part of the Constitution
textualism applies. No textualism will or can explain use of textu-
alism for one but not other parts of the Constitution, particularly
when it is not used for all parts of the Constitution relevant to a
single claim.
Beyond inconsistency in meaning of words (or phrases), be-
yond inconsistency in applications of plain language textualism,
each of which could (theoretically) be corrected, is facially incon-
sistent with itself, with its goals and values. Textualism demands
that constitutional analysis honor the text, and yet, textualism is
completely inconsistent with textualism. Textualism demands
self-righteous adherence to the text, and yet, the text itself says
nothing about interpreting the text. The text does not, within its
words, claim to be binding. It does not in any way suggest that the
proper or, more important, necessary way to interpret the text is
through textualism.
This lack of textual support for textualism exacerbates the
failure to apply textualism consistently. The Constitution provides
no clues as to when the text is to be limited to plain language. The
text cannot explain using textualism for the Takings Clause, but
not for the Eleventh Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.
Textualism cannot use the text alone to explain creating of sover-
eign immunity. Perhaps, most important, textualism cannot use
the text to explain why the Takings Clause should be interpreted
with plain language rather than in light of the textual statements
of purpose expressed on the Preamble.
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Textualism, especially plain language textualism, implicitly
asserts its superiority over other theories of constitutional analy-
sis, yet the text cannot be used to justify either textualism or an
inconsistent application of textualism. Using textualism both in
theory and as applied is inconsistent with textualism.
Instead of eliminating a personalized constitutional interpre-
tation, the plain language textualist relies on personal predilec-
tions in order to eliminate the personal predilections of others.
Having eliminated the personal predilections of others, the textu-
alist, implicitly or explicitly, asserts a form of moral superiority,
i.e., elimination of personal predilections from constitutional in-
terpretation. Restated, textualism is superior to other interpreta-
tional models because it ingrains the textualist's predilections into
constitutional interpretations in order to eliminate the predilec-
tions inherent in those other models. But since the only justifica-
tion for plain language textualism as a superior form of
interpretation is its purported elimination of personal predilec-
tions and since plain language textualism fails at its core to elimi-
nate the personal predilections inherent in the methodology, plain
language textualism, by its own terms, is not superior to any other
method of interpretation. Indeed, plain language textualism is hy-
pocrisy in action, unable to justify itself by its own terms and in-
consistent with its core purpose.
CONCLUSION
This is not to say that the text does not matter. Professor
Polly Price bluntly demands that constitutional analysis "begin
with the text."18 6 Professor Akil Amar argues that text is no more
than "a proper starting point for proper constitutional analy-
sis."187 "[O]ther proper constitutional arguments" occasionally
overcome "plain-meaning textual arguments." 88 The point is that
even if plain language textualism may be a place to begin consti-
tutional analysis, surely it cannot be used to foreclose all other
interpretational methodologies.
186. Polly J. Price, Term Limits on Original Intent? An Essay on Legal Debate and
Historical Understanding, 82 VA. L. REV. 493, 500 (1996).
187. Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1996).
188. Id. For more on the discussion engendered by Amar's ideas, see, e.g., Louis
Michael Siedman, Akhil Amar and The (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure
Liberation, 107 YALE L.J. 2281 (1997).
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